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Earman (2018) has recently argued that the Principal Principle, a principle of rationality
connecting objective chance and credence, is a theorem of quantum probability theory. This
paper critiques Earman’s argument, while also offering a positive proposal for how to understand
the status of the Principal Principle in quantum probability theory.
1 Introduction
A particle is approaching a Stern-Gerlach magnet oriented in the x direction. You know the particle
is in the spin-up-z state, ↑z. How confident should you be that an ‘UP’ outcome will be registered?
Answer: you should be 50% confident. Here’s one story for why. Knowing the particle is in the ↑z
state tells you that the chance of ‘UP’ is |〈↑x|↑z〉|2 = 1/2. And epistemic rationality demands you
conform your credences to known chances.
The last step in this reasoning is an application of the Principal Principle, which says (roughly)
that if an agent knows the objective chance of a proposition E is x, then she should set her degree
of belief in E to x (Lewis, 1980). It is controversial what quantum chances really are, and if they
are objective. But if they are objective, then this looks like a paradigm application of the Principal
Principle.
On the standard way of understanding the Principal Principle, it is a normative requirement
that goes above and beyond other more background constraints on rational credence, like proba-
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bilism and conditionalization. While authors have disagreed about whether the principle can be
independently justified and if so how (Strevens, 1999; Ward, 2005; Pettigrew, 2012, 2013; Childers,
2012; Schwarz, 2014; Builes and Spencer, ms), almost all agree that an agent can be probabilisti-
cally coherent and yet still violate it. However, Earman (2018) has recently suggested that in the
quantum context, the principle:
Quantum Principal Principle (QPP), rough version: if an agent learns that the state of the
system is ψ, then she should set her credence in E to ψ(E), the chance ψ assigns to E,
follows as a “theorem of quantum probability theory”, together with the usual coherence require-
ments on rational credence. Thus, there is no need to seek a further justification of the principle
in the quantum setting, or to agonize over which variant of it is correct.
This paper assesses Earman’s proposal. I first note that on some interpretations, quantum
chances are modeled by ordinary ‘classical’ (Kolmogorovian) probability theory, not quantum prob-
ability theory, and so there is no need for a new treatment of the QPP on these interpretations.
On other interpretations, Earman is right to point out that QPP requires its own special formula-
tion, and that this is an unaddressed issue in the literature. However, I argue, Earman’s proposed
formulation is not the correct one. I lay out what I take to be the correct formulation, and show
that although intuitively true, it does not follow as a theorem.
Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning a further reason that philosophers and physicists may
be interested in the status of the QPP. An important practice within physics is the reconstruction
of unknown quantum states through measurement. This process of quantum state tomography is
one of several methods used to learn and estimate quantum states (Paris and Rehacek, 2004). To
the extent we think of the physicists in these scenarios as rational agents with credences, we may
be interested in modeling their learning experiences as they hone in on the unknown state. Here
QPP plays a crucial role. Suppose ψ is the true state of the system and E is some experimental
data. By Bayes’ formula:
C(state is ψ|E) = C(E| state is ψ) · C(state is ψ)
C(E)
. (1)
Crucially, the QPP fixes C(E| state is ψ) to ψ(E). This ensures that the higher the chance ψ
assigns to the observation E, the stronger the true hypothesis is supported. The QPP also helps
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C(E| state is ψi) · C(state is ψi) =
∑
i
ψi(E) · C(state is ψi), (2)
in other words the agent’s credence in the experimental outcome E is equal to her expectation of
its chance. The overall result is that the agent’s credence in the state hypotheses evolves in the way
familiar from Bayesian statistical inference (cf. Lewis (1980, pp. 285–7)). One of my criticisms will
be that Earman’s formulation of the QPP can’t do the normative work required for this application
to quantum state tomography, and statistical inference more generally. At the end of the paper, I
will show that my formulation can.
2 Earman on quantum chance
In quantum probability theory,1 the objects of quantum chance—what I shall call, for lack of a better
term, the quantum propositions—correspond mathematically to the set of all projection operators
on the Hilbert space of the system in question. Quantum chance functions are then defined as
functions on this set of quantum propositions. They output numbers between 0 and 1, and obey
similar axioms to classical (Kolmogorovian) probability functions.
In more detail, let H be a separable Hilbert space and let N denote the von Neumann algebra
of all bounded operators acting on H. A projection E ∈ N is a self-adjoint element satisfying
E2 = E. Let P(N) denote the set of projections on N. Then a quantum chance function is a map
ω : P(N)→ [0, 1] satisfying:





i ω(Ei) for any countable collection {Ei} of mutually orthogonal projections.2
Example 1. In the Stern Gerlach case, we can consider the projection P↑x = |↑x〉 〈↑x| corresponding
to the proposition that the ‘UP’ outcome will occur. Since the particle is in state ↑z, the quantum
1Here I follow the presentation of Earman (2018); cf. also von Neumann (1955), Bub (1977), Hughes (1989, Ch. 8),
Pitowsky (2006), Rédei and Summers (2007), Strocchi (2008, Ch. 2.4), and Hemmo and Shenker (2020).
2Here ∨ is the ‘join’ operator, the analogue of disjunction: if E1 and E2 are projection operators, then E1 ∨ E2
is the projection corresponding to the closure of Ran(E1) ∪ Ran(E2). Two projection operators are E1 and E2 are
orthogonal when E1E2 = 0. A collection is mutually orthogonal if every pair is orthogonal.
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chance function is given by ω(E) = 〈↑z|E|↑z〉 for all projections E ∈ P(N). One can verify that ω
satisfies both axioms. In addition, ω(P↑x) = 〈↑z| (|↑x〉 〈↑x|) |↑z〉 = |〈↑z|↑x〉|
2 = 1/2 as expected.
We just saw that specifying the quantum state fixes the quantum chance function. It turns out
that when the dimension of H is greater than two, the converse also holds: specifying the quantum
chance function ω uniquely fixes a quantum state ω : N → C, which we also denote ω.3 If ω is a
vector state, in other words if there exists a vector ψ ∈ H such that ω(A) = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 for all A ∈ N,
then we simply write ω as ψ.
What about credence functions? Earman assumes that in the quantum setting, rational initial
credence functions C are also defined over the quantum propositions P(N). Furthermore, Earman
imposes two basic coherence requirements on these functions:
Probabilism (quantum analogue): rational C satisfy the axioms listed above (and hence can
be extended to a state C : N→ C, which we also denote C), and
Conditionalization (quantum analogue): rational C obey an analogue of Bayesian updating,
called Lüder’s updating, which specifies that for all E,F ∈ P(N):4
C(F |E) = C(EFE)
C(E)
, provided C(E) > 0.
Say an initial credence function C : P(N) → [0, 1] is coherent if it satisfies these quantum
analogues of probabilism and conditionalization. Earman’s main claim is that any coherent credence
function must automatically satisfy the QPP, thanks to the following result:
Theorem 1 (Ruetsche and Earman (2011), Fact 1). Set-up as above, where we suppose dim(H) > 2.
Let C : P(N)→ [0, 1] be any coherent initial credence function. Let ψ ∈ H be any vector state and
let Pψ ∈ P(N) denote the projection onto the vector.5 Then, provided C(Pψ) > 0,
C(·|Pψ) = ψ(·). (3)
3This follows from Gleason’s theorem. Here a quantum state is a normed positive linear functional ω : N→ C on
N. Assuming ω is normal (cf. Ruetsche (2011)), there exists a unique density operator ρω ∈ N with ω(A) = Tr[Aρω]
for all A ∈ N. In this case it is common to use ω and ρω interchangeably.
4Here it is important that C is extended to a state C : N→ C, since for F ∈ P(N) that do not commute with E,
EFE may not be a projection operator, thus leaving the numerator C(EFE) undefined otherwise.
5 Here it crucial that ψ is a vector state, in particular that it is normal (cf. footnote 3) and pure; in ordinary QM,
where N is the von Neumann algebra, the pure normal states coincide with the vector states. Notably, the result
cannot be extended to entangled ω, for instance; see Section 4 for discussion.
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In other words, conditional on Pψ, the credences C must align with the chances ψ.
Based on this result, Earman concludes that the truth of the QPP is not a matter “to be sub-
mitted to the intuitions of wise analytical metaphysicians” but rather one to be proved: “credence
and chance have been brought into alignment without the cudgel of any extra normative principle”
(Earman, 2018, p. 10).
3 Examining Earman’s argument
Note that for Earman’s result to establish QPP, it is crucial that the projection Pψ represent the
proposition 〈the state of the system is ψ〉, or 〈the chances are given by ψ〉. My main criticism of
Earman’s argument is that this claim is false, and so Equation (3) does not establish the Principal
Principle.
Before I elaborate on this criticism, I should clarify an important issue regarding the scope
of Earman’s argument. Earman’s choice to model quantum chances using quantum probability
theory—and in particular to define chances over the set P(N) of all projection operators—is not
uncontroversial. Some quantum theories end up privileging a certain subset of commuting operators.
This often brings them into the setting of ordinary ‘classical’ Kolmogorovian probability theory
(Loewer, 1994). For example, in GRW theory, position is given a privileged role. The objective
chances in this theory are the chances attached to spontaneous collapses of the position wave
function. At a given time, the possible states of the world at the next time form the relevant set
of possibilities. Chance is more naturally represented by a classical probability measure over this
set: it selects which of these disjoint possibilities obtain, with the specific probabilities determined
by the current spatial wave function and the given collapse constant. (Of course, spin and other
degrees of freedom are still subject to chancy jumps, but only insofar as they are entangled with
the spatial wave function.)
Similar remarks apply to Bohmian and Everettian mechanics. Bohmian mechanics is deter-
ministic and so does not involve objective chances in Lewis’s original sense. But insofar as it does
feature a kind of objective chance, it is represented by an ordinary classical measure over initial
Bohmian particle configurations. Again, this is related to the privileging of position in the theory.
Similarly, the status of chance in the Everettian mechanics is a fraught issue, but to the extent
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it features in the theory, objective chance is more naturally represented as a classical probability
measure, this time over disjoint branching possibilities. What makes this possible is the selec-
tion through decoherence of a preferred ‘quasi-classical’ basis over which branching occurs. (For a
detailed treatment of both chance and Bayesianism in this setting, see Wallace (2012, Part II).)
The upshot is that on many quantum theories, standard treatments of the Principal Princi-
ple will carry over, and Earman’s discussion won’t apply.6 That said, on other interpretations,
including but not limited to quantum logic interpretations (Stairs, 1983), information-theoretic in-
terpretations (Bub, 2005), and certain pragmatist interpretations (Healey, 2017), quantum chances
are understood as ranging over all projection operators. In these settings and others, Earman is
correct to point out that we need to resituate QPP within quantum probability theory. Thus, for
the rest of this paper, I will assume we are in such a setting.
With these caveats in mind, let us return to the criticism. In order for Earman’s result (3)
to establish the Principal Principle, it is crucial that Pψ represent the proposition 〈the state of
the system is ψ〉. But there is strong reason to reject this premise. For example, consider a spin-
1/2 particle whose state is entirely unknown. Then the proposition 〈the state is either ↑z or ↓z〉
is contingent, since it is possible that the true initial state is neither ↑z nor ↓z but rather some
superposition of the two. However, P↑z ∨P↓z is a necessity; it coincides with the identity operator.
More generally, for any orthonormal basis {ψi}, even though
∨
i〈the state is ψi〉 may be contingent
because the true state may be a superposition of the basis elements,
∨
i Pψi is always a necessity.
This suggests that the projections Pψi do not represent propositions like 〈the state is ψi〉, since
they do not obey the same logic. To press the point, note that if ψ1 and ψ2 are distinct, we would
expect C(state is ψ1 or ψ2) = C(state is ψ1) + C(state is ψ2), since either the true initial state is
ψ1, or it is ψ2, or it is neither. However, it is well known (Strocchi, 2008, p. 51) that we may have
C(Pψ1 ∨ Pψ2) > C(Pψ1) + C(Pψ2) (4)
when ψ1 and ψ2 are non-orthogonal.
7
6This is not to say that quantum probability theory is misguided, or that it doesn’t play an important role in our
understanding of quantum mechanics. Rather this is to say that on certain specific foundational approaches, ordinary
‘classical’ probability theory is ultimately the more appropriate means to represent quantum chances.
7Again consider a spin-1/2 particle (examples in higher dimensions can also be given) and let C be the coherent
credence function corresponding to the vector state ↑z. Suppose ψ1 = ↑x and ψ2 = ↓z. Then Pψ1 ∨ Pψ2 = I so
C(Pψ1 ∨ Pψ2) = 1, but C(Pψ1) + C(Pψ2) = |〈↑z | ↑z〉|
2 + |〈↑z | ↓z〉|2 = 1/2 + 0 < 1.
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In response, one might object that just because 〈the state is ψi〉 is represented by Pψi for all
i, it does not follow that the disjunction 〈the state is ψ1 or ψ2〉 must be represented by Pψ1 ∨ Pψ2 ,
or more generally that
∨
i〈the state is ψi〉 must be represented by
∨
i Pψi . In particular, this step
assumes that the disjunction in the state hypothesis must be interpreted as the join operator ‘∨’ on
the projections (which yields the closure of the union of their ranges), and this assumption could
be denied. Of course, this line of response immediately faces the question of what operation, if not
join, we are supposed to take the ‘or’ to correspond to. At least at first blush, there is no clear
alternative operation, or alternative way of representing these disjunctive state hypotheses, yet we
surely want to say that agents can entertain and assign credences to them.
But there is a bigger obstacle for this line of response, which is that the problems with rep-
resenting state hypotheses by projections Pψ extend beyond cases involving the join operator ∨.
Imagine that the agent is not sure which of some collection of states {ψi} the system is in, but she
is certain the system is in one of them, so
∑
iC(state is ψi) = 1. Suppose for simplicity that the
collection {ψi} is finite and forms an orthonormal basis. Recalling the discussion of quantum state




C(E| state is ψi) · C(state is ψi),
i.e. the agent’s credence in E equals her expectation taken over the mutually exclusive and exhaus-




C(E|Pψi) · C(Pψi), (5)
even though
∑
iC(Pψi) = 1 and the {ψi} are an ON basis, and hence the {Pψi} are partitional.
This is further evidence that the projections Pψi do not represent state hypotheses. (For another
similar cautionary tale about the interpretation of projection operators, see also Weinstein (1996).)
Example 2. Consider a spin-1/2 particle (the example can be extended to higher dimensions) and
let the collection {ψi} consist of ↑z and ↓z. Let C be the coherent credence function corresponding
to the vector state ↑x; note that
∑
iC(Pψi) = C(P↑z) +C(P↓z) = 1/2 + 1/2 = 1, as required. Now
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let E = P↑x . Then C(E) = 1, but C(E|P↑z) ·C(P↑z)+C(E|P↓z) ·C(P↓z) = 1/2 ·1/2+1/2 ·1/2 < 1.8
An important consequence of this last result is that Earman’s alleged Principal Principle, even




ψi(E) · C(Pψi) (6)
even though
∑
iC(Pψi) = 1. If we do interpret Pψi as 〈the state is ψi〉, as Earman’s formulation of




ψi(E) · C(state is ψi), (7)
even though
∑
iC(state is ψi) = 1. In other words, the agent’s credences need not match her
expectations of the chances.9 But as we saw in the discussion of quantum state tomography, this
is supposed to be a crucial consequence of QPP.
4 Preparation, projective measurement, and a classical analogue
If Earman’s theorem does not establish QPP, then what does it establish?
The theorem establishes that if the system was knowingly prepared in state ψ by a projective
measurement with outcome Pψ, then rational credence must align with ψ. Indeed this is the gloss
that Earman offers in several places (2018, p. 10, notation adapted):
The intended interpretation of this [result] should be obvious. Suppose that an agent
whose initial credence function on P(N) is C learns that a Yes-No experiment for Pψ
has been performed and that a Yes answer has been returned. Since she is rational she
Lüders updates her credence function to C(·|Pψ). On the objectivist interpretation of
8Here we apply (3) to obtain C(E|P↑z ) = ↑z(E) = 1/2 and C(E|P↓z ) = ↓z(E) = 1/2. More generally, let






ψi. Set C(·) = ϕ(·) and
E = Pϕ. Then C(E) = 1 but
∑









9It is true that given C it can always be expressed as C(·) =
∑
i ψi(·) · C(Pψi) for some orthonormal {ψi}.
However the issue was whether given any collection of mutually exclusive and exhaustive chance hypotheses, the
agent’s credences should equal her expectations over those chance hypotheses. At the very least, we would expect
that if all the {ψi} assign the same chance to E, then C(E) will equal that chance. But if the proposition 〈state is ψi〉
is represented by the projection Pψi then this claim also fails: note that in the previous example, ↑z(E) = ↓z(E) = 1/2
yet C(E) 6= 1/2.
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quantum probabilities, the returning of a Yes answer implies that the normal pure state
ψ has been prepared, and, hence, that the objective chance of an event E ∈ P is ψ(E),
which is the same as the agent’s updated credence, C(E|Pψ).
Although interestingly related to QPP, this result is not sufficient for it. There are two main ways
to see that it falls short.
First, note that many preparations do not involve projective measurements (Fröhlich and Schub-
nel, 2016). For example, I can prepare a crystal in its ground state ψ by leaving it in a cold room.
Yet, QPP still requires I conform my credences to ψ, even though no projective measurement took
place. Furthermore, it seems that even if no preparation of the system has taken place at all,
for instance if I going to measure some cosmic rays incident on my laboratory that nobody has
interacted with, QPP should still require I conform my credence in accordance with the expected
state. Yet in these cases Earman’s result won’t apply.
Second, the result only applies to vector states ψ ∈ H. But suppose that the system S is
entangled with another S′. If the agent knows S’s state, it seems she should still be required to
set her credences in line with that state, but since the state won’t be pure, the result won’t apply.
(Here Earman could respond that we should move to the composite system Hc = H ⊗ H′ and
consider pure states ψc ∈ Hc of it. But I am imagining the agent is only probing S, so there is
no “Yes-No experiment for Pψc” being performed, only Yes-No experiments for propositions of the
form F ⊗ I, where F ∈ P(B(H)) and I ∈ P(B(H′)) the identity.)
In fact, attending to this restriction to pure states, we can see that an exactly analogous result
also holds in classical probability theory. Some preliminaries: Let (S,S) be a classical outcome
space, with S a set and S a sigma-algebra on S. Define a state µ as a probability measure on
(S,S). A state µ is pure if it cannot be expressed as a trivial convex combination of other states.
One can check that in this classical context, a state is pure if and only if it is a point measure
concentrated at some s ∈ S, which I will write as µs. It follows the pure states µs are in one-to-one
correspondence with the elements of S. Next, define a projection operator as a random variable
X : S → R that satisfies X2 = X. One can check that every projection can be expressed as an
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indicator X = 1J for some J ∈ S, in other words a {0, 1}-valued function:
1J(s) = µs(J) =

1 if s ∈ J
0 if s ∈ S\J.
For some pure state ψ = µs we can consider the projection Pψ = 1{s} which tests whether s
′ ∈ S
belongs to {s}. Like in the quantum case, we also associate Pψ with the claim that a Yes-No
experiment for Pψ has been performed, and that a Yes answer has been returned: Pψ = {s′ ∈ S :
1{s}(s
′) = 1} = {s}. Now, with these preliminaries in hand, we can obtain a classical analogue of
Theorem 1:
Theorem 2 (Classical analogue). Let C : S → [0, 1] be any coherent initial credence function. Let
ψ be any pure state and let Pψ denote the projection defined above. Then, provided C(Pψ) > 0,
C(·|Pψ) = ψ(·).
For proof, recall we can write ψ = µs for some s ∈ S and Pψ = {s′ ∈ S : 1{s}(s′) = 1} = s
where we abuse notation and write {s} as s. Now if C(s) 6= 0, then for all J ∈ S,





1 if s ∈ J,
0 if s ∈ S\J,
and so C(J |s) = µs(J) = ψ(J) as desired.
Intuitively, what is going on here is that since ψ is pure, Pψ is an atomic proposition that
specifies the exact outcome. Conditionalizing on this outcome, one is forced to align one’s credence
with the post-experiment chance of the outcome, which is either 0 or 1. And so, in this very
restricted sense, “credence and chance have been brought into alignment without the cudgel of any
normative principle.”
Needless to say, while a notable result, this does not constitute a proof of the Principal Principle.
And as I have suggested here, although its quantum analogue is far more interesting, it is not a
proof of the quantum Principal Principle either.
This discussion also makes evident the reliance, in Earman’s result, on the choice to focus on the
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von Neumann algebra N = B(H), which has atoms. In some quantum field theoretic settings, such
as in the setting of Type-III factor algebras, there are no atoms in the relevant algebra (Ruetsche
and Earman, 2011). The prospect of extending Earman’s result to such settings looks dim.
5 Formulating the Quantum Principal Principle
I now present my positive proposal for how to formulate the QPP within the framework of quantum
probability theory. As we’ll see, while the resulting principle is highly intuitive, it does not follow
as a theorem.
We begin by dividing the agent’s credence function C into two components, x and µ. The first
component, x, is what I previously denoted C: it is a function on the set of projections P(N) that,
at minimum, satisfies the coherence requirements from Section 2. The second component, µ, is the
key ingredient that was missing from Earman’s approach. It is a (classical Kolmogorovian) credence
distribution over the set of possible initial quantum states of the system. Roughly speaking, whereas
x represents the agent’s ignorance about experimental outcomes, µ represents her ignorance about
the true state. The QPP then constrains how x and µ relate. It implies, for instance, that the




ψi(E) · µ(ψi) ∀E ∈ P(N), (8)
where the different state hypotheses are weighted by µ, and I have assumed, for simplicity, that µ
is a discrete distribution over finitely many vector states {ψi}. Even at this point, we can see that
QPP is not a theorem of quantum probability theory, since there are many pairs (x, µ), with x and
µ both coherent, that violate (8). For instance, suppose x corresponds to a vector state like ↑z and
µ assigns probability less than 1 to ↑z. Then x(P↑z) = 1 >
∑
i ψi(P↑z) · µ(ψi). As I understand the
QPP, then, it is a norm that goes beyond usual coherence requirements. Let us now formulate this
norm in full detail.
Fix a separable Hilbert space H and associated algebra of bounded operators N. Let K de-
note the set of quantum states on N. This set comes naturally equipped with the weak∗ topology.
Let σ(K) denote the sigma-algebra on K generated by this topology. Now we can consider Kol-
11
mogorovian probability measures µ on (K,σ(K)). As in Section 2, we can also consider quantum
probability functions x on P(N). A coherent credence function C is then modeled as a pair (x, µ).
Example 3. In the case of a spin one-half particle, µ can be thought of as a probability density
over the Bloch sphere of spin states, and x a point in the sphere. If (x, µ) obeys QPP, then x will
be the ‘weighted average’ of the points supported by µ.
We are interested in how a rational C changes with new evidence. If the evidence is an experi-





However, to know how C updates, we also need to know how µ updates: after learning data E, how
should the agent’s credences in hypotheses H about the (initial) state of the state of the system




∀H ∈ σ(K). (9)
In the case H = {ψ}, this is just a more elaborate way of stating (1).
What determines the agent’s credence xH(E) in data E given H? Enter the QPP:





for all experimental outcomes E ∈ P(N) and state hypotheses H ∈ σ(K) such that µ(H) > 0.
Equation (10) says the agent’s credence in data E given state hypothesis H is the expectation of




provided µ(H) > 0,






In the special case where H is the trivial (necessary) state hypothesis K, we obtain the result




ω(E) dµ(ω), ∀E ∈ P(N). (11)
In mathematical terminology, x is the barycenter for µ (Alfsen, 2012). Note that this reduces to
(8) when µ is a discrete distribution over finitely many vector states.
In the special case where H = {ν} is a hypothesis about a specific state ν then, assuming









in other words the agent’s credence in E given that the quantum state is ν must match the chance
of E according to ν. This is exactly what QPP is supposed to capture. (And unlike the formulation
(3), it applies both when ν is a vector state ψ and when ν is an entangled state.)





If µ is a discrete distribution over finitely many vector states {ψi}, then this becomes, µE(ψ) =
ψ(E)·µ(ψ)∑
i ψi(E)·µ(ψi)
, which is just a way of spelling out Equations (1) and (2).
Example 4. A physicist has two identically prepared electrons. She knows they are either in
state ↑x, ↑y, or ↑z, and is equally confident in these three hypotheses. She then measures the first
electron in the spin-z direction and obtains an ‘UP’ outcome. How should her confidences over the
hypotheses about the (initial) spin state change? Here we have




The data the agent received is represented by E = P↑z ⊗ I. Assuming she satisfies QPP, her
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posterior credence in the hypothesis ↑z ⊗ ↑z is determined by (13):
µE(↑z ⊗ ↑z) =
1
3 · (↑z ⊗ ↑z)(E)
1














As expected, the agent’s credence in the ↑z hypothesis increases. A similar calculation shows that,
as expected, her credence in the ↑x and ↑y hypotheses decreases:





























So the agent begins with credence (x, µ) and ends with credence (xE , µE), where xE(·) = x(E ·
E)/x(E) and µE is specified by the above three equations.
What if the agent then obtains a second piece of experimental evidence F ∈ P(N), say, through
measuring the spin of the second electron? Here we need to check that our prescription for credal
change is consistent, in the sense that if E and F commute, then beginning with (x, µ) and learning
EF gives the same result as receiving E, updating to (xE , µE), and then learning F . A complication
arises related to the fact that QPP is formulated for initial credence functions. If the agent already




ωE(F ) dµEH(ω) ∀E ∈ P(N), H ∈ σ(K), F ∈ P(N), (14)
where µEH is defined as the result of conditioning µE on H, or equivalently, µH on E. Now, one
can check that receiving EF , and so shifting to xEF (·) = x(FE·EF )x(EF ) and µEF (·) =
x(·)(EF )·µ(·)
x(EF ) , gives
the same result as receiving E and then F , and so shifting to (xE)F (·) and (µE)F (·).10












































where here for second equality we apply (14), for the fifth we apply (12), and for the last equality we apply (10).
Second, note that since E and F are commuting projections, we have x(FEF ) = x(EF ) = x(EFE).
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Example 4 (continued). The agent then measures the second electron in the spin-y direction and
obtains a ‘down’ outcome, represented by F = I ⊗ P↓y . How should her credences over her three
hypotheses about the state change now? Again using the QPP, in particular (13) but with µE
instead of µ determining the weights, we have
µEF (↑z ⊗ ↑z) =
1
2 · (↑z ⊗ ↑z)(F )
1
4 [(↑x ⊗ ↑x)(F ) + (↑y ⊗ ↑y)(F )] +
1


















By similar reasoning, µEF (↑x ⊗ ↑x) = 13 and µEF (↑y ⊗ ↑y) = 0. As expected, the ↓y result ruled
out the hypothesis that the electrons were prepared in the ↑y state, but did not change the relative
likelihood of the ↑z and ↑x hypotheses.
This treatment can be extended to more complicated quantum state tomography set-ups in-
volving more copies, as well as other state estimation scenarios.
6 Conclusion
How do quantum chances constrain credence? At least some interpretations of quantum mechanics
demand that we recast the Principal Principle within the framework of quantum probability theory.
Earman (2018) sought to do so, and came to a surprising conclusion: the principle follows as a
theorem. I started down the same path as Earman, but came to a different conclusion. The
Quantum Principal Principle, appropriately formulated, is not a theorem of quantum probability
theory; its justification does not come so straightforwardly. However, I still found that bringing the
Principal Principle into the domain of quantum probability theory is a worthwhile and overlooked
project. Not only does it yield new insight into the principle itself, as Earman showed, it also allows
us to bring the principle to bear on important applications, like the learning of quantum states.
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